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Abstract: The forest reforms unfolding during the last two decades in the western Amazon have
embraced policy regimes founded on the principles of sustainable forest management. The policy
frameworks adopted for smallholder forestry aimed to clarify forest rights including those of the
indigenous people and smallholders, support the adoption of sustainable forest management and put
a system in place to assure a legal timber supply. The emerging forest policy regimes have significantly
shaped who has access to the forest, how the forest resources are used and the benefits that are utilized.
We argue that forest reforms have not addressed some critical constraints facing smallholders in
managing their forests either individually or collectively. Informal timber extraction persists with
contradictory effects on smallholders and forests. Local participants continue to make a significant
contribution in meeting a growing demand for timber through vigorous market networks that
combine legal and illegal sources of timber supply. Some recent changes to forest policy frameworks
emphasize approaches towards additional integrated forest management, simplification of regulations
and incentives for improved forest management. We critically reflect on the scope, implementation
and expected outcomes of these policy frameworks.
Keywords: Amazon; forest management; forest policy; forest governance; smallholders; Bolivia;
Ecuador; Peru
1. Introduction
Large portions of the territories of Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru are covered with tropical and
subtropical forests. The countries make up a large part of the western Amazon. Local groups
include indigenous people, non-indigenous long term and more recent residents of rural settlements
and smallholders (We will use the term “smallholders” throughout this text to refer to individual
landholders, indigenous and non-indigenous communities. Occasionally, where it is appropriate we
specifically refer to any of these three groups). All of these groups depend, in different degrees, on the
forests to meet their daily livelihood needs and extract forest products, including timber, to add to their
monetary income. Nowadays forest based smallholders contribute significantly to the domestic and
international timber supply. How forests contribute to smallholder incomes and livelihood strategies is
influenced by the rules that regulate forest use and management; and the market conditions for forest
products mainly because rules and markets do shape the dynamics of the forestry sector in general.
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Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru implemented forest policy reforms—or forest reforms—from the mid- to
late-1990s, inspired by sustainable forest management (SFM) principles [1]. The new forestry regimes in
each country shared three objectives: (i) stimulate smallholder forestry through wide reaching land and
forest ownership changes; (ii) improve forest management practices by all forest users; and (iii) reduce
unauthorized practices along the timber value chain through timber legality verification.
Our paper examines how the forest reforms in the three countries currently influence smallholder
forestry. We attempt to answer the following questions: What is the influence of tenure rights in
stimulating smallholder forestry?; what are the main barriers preventing the adoption of SFM by
smallholders?; and, why does unauthorized timber extraction persist among this group of forest users?
These questions are at the center of the current debate on how to enhance the contribution of forests to
smallholder livelihoods while at the same time securing the provision of forest ecosystem services.
With this paper we hope to contribute to the broader efforts in order to improve land use governance
in contributing to rural development [2] and align those efforts with wider efforts for forest-based
contributions to climate change mitigation and adaptation [3].
We selected Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru because they hold an important portion of Western Amazon
and have a shared history of land occupation in the Amazon. They also share policy and regulatory
frameworks inspired by common development paradigms. We undertook a literature review and
carried out interviews between July 2011 and October 2014 in the department of Pando in Bolivia,
the provinces of Napo and Orellana in Ecuador and the departments of Loreto, Ucayali and Madre de
Dios in Peru. The interviews were part of a comparative study on the influence of forest regulations
on timber markets and smallholder livelihoods, implemented by CIFOR and partners. Interviewees
included staff of state agencies, forestry projects and NGOs, timber intermediaries and local authorities.
Reports with detailed descriptions of the methodologies are available for Bolivia [4], Ecuador [5] and
Peru [6].
The paper contains five parts. Section 2 describes smallholder forestry and its contribution
to broader forestry sector developments in the Amazon regions of the three countries. Section 3
summarizes the relevant legal and policy evolutions over time and emerging policy views. Section 4
discusses the implications of forest reforms for smallholder forestry emphasizing the allocation of
tenure rights, forest management systems and timber markets. The last section presents the discussion
and conclusions.
2. Smallholders and Forest Use in Western Amazon
Forests cover 49 million ha in Bolivia, 11 million ha in Ecuador and 73 million ha in Peru
(Figure 1). Production forests in Bolivia and Peru are given out as forest concessions, of which there
are 3.8 million ha in Bolivia and 7.6 million ha in Peru. Ecuador has no forest concessions (Table 1).
Indigenous and non-indigenous people control a significant amount of forest but part of it overlaps
with protected areas. The contributions of forestry and smallholder forestry to the national economies
in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru vary. The historical processes of land occupation and infrastructure
development in the Amazon, the trends of industrial forestry and wider sociopolitical dynamics
account for the differences. The formal contribution of forests to total gross domestic product, mostly
production and trade of timber is about 3% in Bolivia, 2% in Ecuador and 1% in Peru [7].
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fire ood, materials for construction, among thers. However, forests also provide important resources
for commercial use, not bly timber, with growing market de and due to urban xpansio . In Bolivia
a d Peru, most of the timber supply o iginates from forests in the Amazon, which are abundant
compared to the poorly developed plantati ns in these c untries. In contrast, Ecuador produces much
more timber in plantations than Peru and Bolivi [10]. Timber from plantations is complemented with
timber from the country’s Amazon native forest [11]. A major portion of the timber from native forest
extracted by smallholders in the three countries o iginat s f om the Amazon (T ble 1).
Ecuador has a relatively well-developed industrial sector that sources its raw material for
briquettes and plywood from timber plantations located in the highlands and co stal zones [12].
In addition, an important small-scal artisan l sector in the Ecuadorian Amazon involves smallholders
who supply timber for construction and furniture manufacturing to the main urban centers [5].
Peru has an i po tant timber industry, which depe ds on timber fro Amazo ian smallholder
lands and f rest concessions. Because of a more stringent implementation of forest regulations, in
rec nt years ma y concessi ns have been r turned to the state but timber is still widely harvested
illegally [13,14]. Am zonian timber supplies the construction ector and the domestic manufacturing
industry in the main cities [15,16]. In Bolivia, most of the timber originates rom the Amazon a d it
supplies domestic markets and export markets. The domestic mark ts for timber prod ction in Bolivia,
Ecuador Peru, mainly in the furniture and construction sectors, are likely to continue to exp
due to an increasing demand associated with a growing urban populati [17].
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Table 1. Selected Information on the Forestry Sector in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru.
Key Select Indicators Bolivia Ecuador Peru
Total forest area (million ha) 49.0 a 11.0 b 73.0 c
Average annual domestic market consumption, 2008–2012
(roundwood equivalent in million m3) 0.8
d 2.6 e 2.1 f
Total area of state production forests allocated to timber and
non-timber forest concessions (million ha) 3.8
d 0.0 7.6 g
Total land occupied by smallholders in the Amazon (million ha) 20.7 h 7.5 i 13.2 g
Total area of forests under approved management plans for
timber for smallholders (million ha) 0.59
d 0.16 j 0.03 k
Production in native forests (million m3, average 2008–2012) 1.1 d 0.2 e 1.6 l
Average contribution (%) to timber supply by smallholders in the
Amazon, 2008–2012 84.0
m 35.0 e 22.0 n
Small-scale forestry operations carried out without an approved
forest management plan (%) NA 70.0
o 80.0 p
Notes: a based on Killeen et al. [18]; b CORPEI [11]; c Ministerio del Ambiente [19]; d ABT [20]; e Ministerio
del Ambiente [21]; f based on data from Ministerio de Agricultura [22]; g ITTO [23]; h taken from Pacheco
and Benatti [24]; i based on Añazco et al. [25]; j based on FAO [26]; k based on Presidencia del Consejo de
Ministros [27]; l based on data from Ministerio del Ambiente [13,22]; m authors’ own estimate based on data
from ABT [28] for 2010–2012; n based on authors’ estimates with Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática
(INEI) census data from 2007 and an average of 7 m3 per family, per year based on authors’ data collected in 2013
and 2014 in Ucayali, Madre de Dios and Loreto; o authors’ estimates based on interviews with 129 households
that carried out forestry operations (out of the 226 households interviewed from August 2011 to September 2012
in Napo Province and from February 2011 to July 2012 in Orellana province) see Mejía and Pacheco [5,24];
p based on OSINFOR [29].
Compared to Ecuador and Peru, the timber industry in Bolivia is relatively unimportant.
In addition to meeting domestic demand, a few processing companies have specialized producing
furniture for the export market. Bolivian timber is sourced from forest concessions and communal
lands. Forest concessions granted in public production forests used to be significant in Bolivia and an
important portion were under FSC certification. But small-scale timber extraction has expanded over
time, while forest concessions have been reduced significantly since the late 2000s [30]. Timber exports
have also declined and domestic markets constitute the main demand for timber production, which is
also met by imports [31].
Smallholders occupy an important forest area in all three countries, yet the legal ownership of
these lands vary. In Bolivia and Ecuador, smallholder communities have legal ownership over relatively
large areas of forest but not so in Peru. Only a small portion of lands held by smallholder communities
are under formal forest management plans, suggesting that most of the timber originating from
smallholders’ lands is harvested illegally. This is also suggested by the contributions of smallholders to
the timber supply in Bolivia (84%), Ecuador (35%) and Peru (22%) (Table 1). Other locals also engage
in timber harvesting, including chainsaw operators and small operators. A variety of intermediaries
channels this timber to the large timber producers or traders [32].
Smallholders adopt different forms and practices of forest management but their implications
for forest composition and structure in the long term are not well known. Smallholder-based forest
management may range from large-scale selective logging, particularly in indigenous lands in lowland
Bolivia [32] to low-intensity harvesting in small-sized plots and chainsaw milling. The latter system
is quite extensive in the Ecuadorian Amazon [5] and is also widely adopted in the Bolivian [4] and
Peruvian Amazon [6]. There is no strong evidence to suggest that smallholder forest management is
more destructive than the management practices following SFM principles [33].
In Ecuador, timber volumes extracted by smallholders in single operations without formal
management plans tend to be lower than timber volumes extracted in single operations with
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management plans [34]. Formal timber operations are often organized by intermediaries who have the
resources to obtain extraction permits, who want to maximize the volume extracted and from the most
valuable species. Ecuadorean smallholders who operate without a management plan often choose
soft species that require less labor and capital [10]. Small-scale logging and milling in northern La Paz
in Bolivia and Pucallpa in Peru results in heavy logging of hard wood species, resulting in forest
degradation [32]. Smallholders in Ecuador and Peru are increasingly logging timber species from
forest regrowth [35]. In the Ecuadorian Amazon, swidden-fallow species such as Piptocoma discolor and
Cordia alliodora are now commonly harvested [36] and sold in urban markets. In the Peruvian Amazon
Guazuma crinita is harvested and used in coastal cities for the manufacture of prefabricated houses [37].
Timber however, is not the main source of income for smallholders or communities in the western
Amazon [38]. Most smallholders who extract timber rely on a mix of subsistence and cash-income
activities [39]. Only in a few cases is timber extraction the primary economic activity and mostly where
development projects have encouraged communities to focus on commercial logging [40]. For example
in the Ecuadorian Amazon, about 16% of total smallholder income originates from timber extraction [5].
This portion is 38.8% in the Peruvian Amazon [41] and it ranges from 15% to 30% in the Bolivian
Amazon [42]. Forest regulations implicitly assume that smallholders can dedicate sufficient attention to
timber management. In many cases however, decisions about timber extraction are made by chainsaw
operators and intermediaries, while smallholders make decisions on a broad portfolio of land and
resource use, including agriculture and forest management see [43–45].
3. Forest Reforms That Focus on Smallholder Forestry
3.1. First Wave of Forest Reforms
The neo-liberal economic policies of the 1990s assigned a dominant role to external markets [46],
including the national agricultural and manufacture sectors. State subsidies, price controls and tariffs
for imports were suppressed [47]. Institutional conditions for biodiversity conservation concurred
with support for agricultural expansion [48] but also with decentralizing decision-making at lower
levels of government and expanding local participation [49]. External pressures from multilateral
organizations and donors, improved planning and investment of public funds, addressed a growing
demand from social groups for greater participation in decision-making [50]. Decentralization was
implemented in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, with some variations in scope and pace.
In the forest sector, economic development and forest conservation goals fit well with the
principles of SFM, while at the same time allowing the expansion of timber production to meet
the demand from export markets. It was assumed the adoption of SFM could improve the economic
benefits from forests and decrease the pressures from alternative land uses that resulted in forest
conversion [51]. Reduced impact logging (RIL) techniques were expected to increase logging
productivity and improved species inventory linked to harvesting and plans to diversify extraction of
the lesser-known species [52]. Improving timber legality verification would reduce illegal operations
and reduce unfair competition against legal timber [53]. FSC certification was actively promoted to
reward SFM in large-scale commercial operations and later in smallholder timber operations [54].
In addition, greater social demands for land incubated the view that control by local participants
over forests would also allow them to benefit from timber sales, while forests would still remain
protected [55]. Yet, since state bureaucrats saw local communities and smallholders as unable to make
efficient use of forests, they retained the command-and-control approach as a way of state agencies
enforcing the adoption of SFM [56].
The pursuit of SFM triggered distinct policy processes to change the forestry laws in the
three western Amazonian countries. Bolivia approved a new Forestry Law in 1996 and Peru followed
in 2000. In Ecuador, new forest regulations were enacted in 2000. Table 2 presents the main forest
policies related to these three policy goals.
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Table 2. Main Forest Policy Goals and Regulations in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru.
Policy Areas Bolivia a Ecuador b Peru c







smallholders to use the
forests on their lands.
Individual access rights to
forests recognized for
smallholders, and collective
tenure rights recognized for
indigenous communities.
Indigenous collective rights
are recognized by the state, as
well as forest rights on
individual landholdings.





require approval of FMPs
and AOPs. FMPs require the
elaboration of inventories
and censuses.
Non-commercial uses do not
require a plan.
Simplified FMPs based on
rapid inventories and species
regulations are possible for
agroforestry and silvo-pastoral
systems and native forest for
non-mechanized
extraction operations.
Commercial uses require an
FMP and AOP as the main
tools to achieve sustainable
forest management.
The logging of small volumes







with reduced fees for
smallholders over the total
forest area under
commercial use.
Costs for the granting of
permits vary depending on the
type of mechanism used for
harvesting, the type of forest
formation and the
volume harvested.
No incentives in place for
forest management. Some
credits in place that can be





Support for elaboration of
harvesting permits by
municipal governments. No
other support is provided.
State support is provided
based on public forestry
technicians that assist in
preparing forestry permits
for smallholders.
Forestry extension services are
limited by available resources.
Companies provide private
extension services.






Origin (CFOs) issued based
on FMPs. Legality
verification is conducted in
log collection centers outside
of the operation areas
Legal verification relies on the
SAF, an informatics system
based on the registration of
users, species and timber
volumes from simplified
forestry plans.
OSINFOR is responsible for in
situ-verification. Other types




Notes: a from Forest Law No. 1700, 1996; b Mejía and Pacheco [5]; c Ministerio del Ambiente [21].
The legal frameworks in the three countries specified forest rights associated with individual,
community and public lands, as a keystone to support SFM. Logging permits could only be granted to
smallholders and communities who held formal tenure rights and forest concessionaries. In Bolivia and
Peru, public forestlands could be given out as concessions to utilize timber and NTFPs [57]. Steps were
taken to secure tenure rights for indigenous and non-indigenous communities and smallholders
but with significant differences between the two countries. Secure tenure rights to forestlands were
expected to reduce conflicts between smallholders and timber enterprises as well as foster investments
in SFM [58]. Bolivia demarcated and titled indigenous territories and community lands, followed by
the titling of individual landholdings [59]. Peru granted tenure rights to smallholders and indigenous
communities but also aggressively fostered agricultural, mining and oil investments, which led to
further social conflict [60]. Ecuador regularized land ownership in forestlands but progress was slow
in both indigenous and non-indigenous lands and some conflicts persisted [61].
The three countries also adopted regulations to promote SFM, with the main instruments the forest
management plan (FMP) and the annual operational plans (AOP). FMPs and AOPs were required for
logging in individual landholdings, community lands and forest concessions. Forest regulations were
simplified in Ecuador and smallholders only needed to undertake simple management plans but other
requirements for permit approval still applied, such as the payment of stumpage fees and the use of
accredited foresters to develop the FMPs [5]. Bolivia adopted differentiated management instruments
for concessions and small-scale forest management operations and a progressive system of forest taxes.
The elaboration of FMPs and AOPs is required for all forest operators [62]. Peru’s new regulations for
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timber harvesting were similar to those approved in Bolivia. None of the three countries introduced
strong economic incentives, apart from differentiated forest fees, nor an extension of services to support
sustainable forest management among the smallholders.
All three countries did improve forest monitoring to assess compliance with forest regulations
through the verification of origin of timber supply. Ecuador developed the Forestry Administration
Service (Servicio de Administración Forestal, SAF), which includes electronic verification of permits
on an online platform. In Bolivia, the Forestry Superintendence and later the Forests and Lands
Authority (Autoridad de Fiscalización y Control Social de Bosques y Tierra, ABT), were in charge of legality
verification [30]. Legality verification is weaker in Peru, in part because of tensions between the
central and regional governments on responsibilities for forest administration. Forest control is now
under the Supervisory Body for Forest and Wildlife Resources (Organismo de Supervisión de los Recursos
Forestales y de Fauna Silvestre, OSINFOR), created as an independent body from the forest authority [63].
The three countries have similar designs of legality verification: issuance of transport permits based on
FMPs, which can be prepared either electronically or manually. Permits are verified at fixed or mobile
control points.
The auditing procedures varied in the three countries. In Ecuador, auditors from the Ministry of
Environment controlled compliance of FMPs in the plots where forestry operations were carried out.
In Peru, the forestry authority asserted little control in the field and more control was exercised over
timber transportation. Nowadays, OSINFOR intensively monitors forest concessions and illegal timber
operations on public lands. In Bolivia, compliance became monitored at the timber collection points in
the forest management units before the logs were transported to sawmills. Chainsaw harvesting was
until recently, prohibited in the Bolivian and Peruvian forest laws but it was allowed in Ecuador [64].
The forest reforms neglected to provide incentives and extension services to support sustainable
forest management by smallholders. Almost no public extension services for smallholder forestry
were implemented, with the exception of Ecuador, where a system of forestry advisors was put in
place. It was assumed that smallholders should get access to inputs, extension services and technology
from profit providers [65]. Rather than smallholders acquiring services from markets, development
projects and NGOs stepped in to provide them but mainly as pilot initiatives with limited opportunity
for scaling-up [40].
3.2. Second Wave of Changes in the Forest Policy Frameworks
The 2000s again saw policy changes in western Amazon countries. In Bolivia and Ecuador,
leftist governments reinvigorated the role of the central state in guiding economic development. This
however, undid progress in the devolution of forest responsibilities to municipalities and instead
concentrated decision making at intermediate, administrative levels such as provinces, departments or
regions. Peru’s government did not challenge the central assumptions of market liberalization [66],
while Bolivia and Ecuador favored social redistribution of income. All three countries continued
to rely on the exploitation of natural resources, notably oil, natural gas and mining [67,68], policies
that favored neo-extractive economies, which are considered to provide little long-term economic
development [69].
The democratization of society that accompanied state modernization contributed to the
strengthening of civil society groups and social organizations from a subnational to a national level.
This also increased the input of policy decision-making at the local and national levels, although
this varied depending on the country and the specific contexts [70]. The social perspectives favoring
smallholder forestry gained importance over time and this also prompted changes in forest regulations.
Interestingly, the changes in the forest regulations since the early 2010s have not questioned the
centrality of SFM [71].
The second wave of forest policy reforms aimed to facilitate smallholders to undertake SFM but
under more flexible forest management options. They also improved incentives to support smallholder
forestry, adopted compensations for forest conservation and introduced new methods of timber legality
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verification. These changes were in part, a response to indigenous and non-indigenous peoples and
NGOs linked to these groups, who questioned the outcomes obtained during the first wave of forest
reforms. Nonetheless, despite opportunities for these groups to influence policy decisions, debates
on forest regulations did not adequately accommodate concerns among local participants with the
SFM principles.
Some of the second wave of reforms influenced smallholder forestry in western Amazon as
follows. In Bolivia, the forest agency simplified regulations to grant communities forest permits [72].
In Peru, a new forestry law in 2011 put in place mechanisms to allow smallholders to conduct legal
harvesting operations but in 2016, these mechanisms have not yet being implemented [73]. In Ecuador,
a new environmental code which is under discussion, includes revisions with regards to incentives
for smallholders to protect their forests, regenerate degraded forests and support agroforestry [74].
Table 3 summarizes the main changes proposed and adopted in the three countries.
In Bolivia, renewed attempts aim at improving the control of illegal timber milling for instance,
by implementing new field checkpoints, new ABT offices in areas of significant timber extraction and
audits of forest concessions. Community members can obtain Timber Extraction Permits for Small
Volumes (Autorización de Aprovechamiento de Volúmenes Menores AAVM), which do not require another
plan. Since 2014, community members are allowed to extract 7.07 m3 of timber, six times per year
from communal forest lands. A new policy initiative are the Plans for Integrated Forest and Land
Management (Plan General de Desarrollo Integral de Bosques y Tierras, PGIBT), which aims to provide
a legal basis for both timber and NTFPs use, according to local practices. The Bolivian government
has also created the Joint Mechanism of Mitigation and Adaptation for Integrated and Sustainable
Management of Forests and Mother Earth to channel public resources to communities in order to
support the implementation of PGIBTs [75]. This initiative however, is still in its infancy.
Table 3. Main New Forest Regulations in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru.





Approved new norms in the
period 2012–2014, including:
(i) Timber Extraction Permit
for Small Volumes; (ii) Plan
for Integrated Forest and
Land Management;
and (iii) mechanisms improving
the inspections of concessions.
Recognized the importance of
maintaining simplified forest
management plans. Proposed the
need to mandate for the elaboration of
integrated management plans at the
property level applying since 2014.
Provisions issued in 2015
proposed the establishment of
‘local forests’ as equivalent to
social concessions but no








Introduced public funding for
productive projects to support
sustainable forest management
under the Joint Mechanism of
Mitigation and Adaptation for
Integrated and Sustainable
Management of Forests and
Mother Earth since 2012.
A program to facilitate technical
support to smallholders
(Socio-Manejo) since 2011 but not
provision of financial incentives.
Introduced in new Environmental
Code (drafted in 2014) incentives to
agroforestry systems.
Introduced since 2011 a national
compensation program that
provides resources to








No payments are in place; but an
institutional mechanisms is under
development to provide rewards
to good local forest stewards,
mainly in community lands.
Payments for conservation are
based on area protected
(4–40 USD/year/hectare) based on
predefined selection criteria of
protected hectares.
Payments for conservation are
based on area protected
(3.34 USD/year/hectare) but






Implemented an electronic system
for issuance of timber origin
certificates in 2011. Improved
control in processing centers since
2012. No mechanisms for legality
verification of timber extraction in
small volumes.
Introduced a registry of timber
processors, additional control in
consumption center depots and
improved systems to link timber
supply to demand applies since 2010.
Improved information systems,
and control of forests permits
since 2012. Made local
governments co-responsible for
the functioning and
maintenance of timber legality
verification systems.
Note: Source from Authors’ own elaboration.
In Ecuador, since the National Plan of Well-being was issued in 2007, the government has assumed
a leading role in the control and management of natural and planted forests [76,77]. The introduction
in the early 1990s of simplified harvesting plans was an important step in promoting smallholder
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forestry [34]. Recently, a new program offers technical assistance to smallholders to obtain forestry
permits and some economic incentives support forest conservation. A new draft Environmental Law
introduces the Integrated Management Plan to be implemented at farm level, which also requires
smallholders to register their properties in the Forestry Registry. Forest conversion will require special
permission from the Ministry of Environment but smallholders and indigenous communities may
implement local practices as long as they are not against the existing law. These provisions however,
only apply to timber for domestic household needs and do not apply to commercial logging [74].
Peru’s regulations for forest management remain complex following the new 2011 Forestry
Law. The 2000 Forestry Law favored forest management in concessions [78] but neglected the
smallholders. The new 2011 Law No. 29763 introduces Management Plans for Modalities of Reduced
Scale Extraction, to apply to communities, individual landholdings and local social concessions
(bosques locales). However, civil society groups have complained about the lack of credit and technical
support for the proper functioning of these plans [79], even though the law states that support will be
provided [80]. Members of indigenous and non-indigenous communities favor formalizing their access
to forests through individual permits. Although the law allows small-scale operations to be undertaken
with simplified management plans, the procedure is not yet well established. Community organization
representatives have endorsed the regulations but with the condition that rural communities will gain
tenure rights over the lands over which they claim rights [81].
4. Implications of Forest Reforms for Smallholder Forestry
The institutional and regulatory changes to implement SFM in western Amazonia focused on
clarifying forest tenure rights, instruments to regulating forest use and legal timber verification.
The forest reforms however, failed to address critical constraints that smallholders face when trying
to adopt SFM and engage in timber markets. Recognition of tenure rights is difficult to implement,
smallholder’s legalization of timber extraction is costly and the economic rationale of small-scale
timber extraction often prevents adoption of SFM. Below, we discuss these issues in more detail.
4.1. Recognition of Tenure Rights to Support Smallholder Forestry
Policy reforms in the three countries included regulations to grant tenure rights to smallholders
and indigenous people but their outcomes differed, due to existing land claims and how the process
of land regularization was implemented in practice. In Bolivia, indigenous people received tenure
rights over indigenous territories, including exclusive rights to use forest resources. Tenure rights
were also given to non-indigenous communities and to individual landholders. In Ecuador, individual
access rights to forests were recognized for individual landholders and collective tenure rights were
recognized for indigenous communities. In Peru, individual and collective rights to use forest resources
were also recognized. In the three countries, community and individual landholders are required to
detail a FMP that needs to be approved in order to harvest timber for commercial purposes.
The recognition of indigenous rights over forestlands moved fast in Bolivia [82] and
Ecuador [83,84], but it faced some institutional constraints in Peru [85]. The titling of territories
held by non-indigenous communities and individual landholders proved cumbersome in all three
countries because governments were unwilling to cover related costs. Individual landholders have
been able to acquire land as part of government programs, granting rights in colonized lands; they
simply encroached public lands or they acquired land in informal land markets [84,86]. In some
cases, land regularizations indirectly stimulated occupation of public lands, as individual landholders
expected that state agencies would formalize tenure rights once public lands were occupied and land
improvements could be demonstrated [30].
While secure tenure rights are an important condition for smallholders to adopt SFM, having
tenure does not automatically lead to adhering to SFM principles [87]. In areas more distant from
regional markets, with deficient infrastructure but abundant timber, land tenure is often greatly
disputed, while timber extraction is poorly monitored. In those areas, local forest users depend more
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on timber extraction for their livelihoods than when they live closer to regional towns. But they also
rely more on intermediaries and companies that buy timber or facilitate logging and the latter captures
a higher portion of the benefits [31]. In locations better connected to markets, tenure rights are clearer
and more effectively enforced. In these conditions, smallholders depend less on timber income and
have less incentives to undertake SFM. Closer to markets, high-value timber species are no longer
available. As mentioned before, timber markets are now often turning to fast-growing tree species
from smallholder plots, which increases forestry options for smallholders [36,37].
4.2. Barriers to Adoption of Sustainable Forest Management
The regulations to promote SFM introduced institutional barriers and bureaucratic procedures
that increased the transaction costs for smallholders in undertaking legal timber extraction [9,88,89],
which reduced the benefits for smallholders [90]. The recommended SFM models require input and
technologies that are not easily adopted by smallholders who mostly rely on chainsaw milling [91].
Local collaboration is obligatory for smallholders if they use FMP to undertake SFM [92]. Some
indigenous groups established community enterprises [93]. Only communities that received external
assistance with formulating FMPs; and accessing capital and technologies made significant progress
in adopting SFM practices [33,39,94]. Where this happened however, smallholders became more
vulnerable to price fluctuations in the timber markets [95–97]. In addition, social differentiation tends
to increase with greater access to timber markets [64].
As argued above, improved tenure rights are not enough for smallholders to fully capture the
economic benefits from their forests. Smallholders have to follow cumbersome regulations when
logging their timber for commercial purposes and often the benefit obtained from harvesting does not
justify the payment of the permit costs [60,98]. Also, the market tends to absorb only some species,
which stimulates selective logging of the most valuable species. Estimates of costs and benefits from
the different harvesting procedures can be found elsewhere, see [4–6]. The costs involved in obtaining
permits and the often low benefits derived from harvesting lead smallholders to conducting their
operations outside of the law. In addition, forest technicians have little interest in formulating FMPs in
small areas because that yields smaller income than from the larger areas [10].
The main criticisms of the first wave of forest reforms in the three countries is that they imposed
forest management that demanded external inputs and finance [33]. Regulations were imposed but
they did not come with extension, financial support, or incentives to gradual adopt SFM. Central
government agencies and not decentralized agencies continued with forest administration [99].
Resources transferred to lower tiers of government (municipalities in Ecuador and Bolivia and
regional governments in Peru) for forest control, or supporting local forest users were minimal;
and local governments could not generate significant rents from the exploitation of forests within their
jurisdiction in order to pay for any support [100].
Failing to provide financial incentives to support the adoption of SFM by smallholders has likely
been the most important omission in the policy design, even more so since command-and-control
approaches increased the costs to local forest users and required law enforcement coordination among
the state agencies. Where forestry-oriented projects and NGOs provided technical assistance and
financial resources to community forestry initiatives [40], they also subsidized the certification of
community forest management operations, if and when it happened. Yet, even in most cases of
community forestry certification, the local forest user groups were unable to continue forest certification
as the high costs were not compensated with incomes from sales, mostly in domestic markets [101].
To obtain financial support for forest operations, entrepreneurs often turn to informal money
lenders, as shown by studies in Bolivia [4], Ecuador [5] and Peru [6] and this reinforces existing market
asymmetries. When smallholders aim to undertake legal forest exploitation their FMPs, or equivalent
instruments, need to be approved by foresters accredited by the respective national professional bodies.
In Ecuador the government has put in place a facility to support smallholders, but it has insufficient
capacity to meet demand [5] and no similar facilities exists in Bolivia and Peru.
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4.3. Control of Legal Timber Supply and Persistence of Informal Practices
The control of timber legality is costly and often quite ineffective. This is partly a result of
a chronic lack of resources for law enforcement but also because of persistent, corrupt practices
of public agencies in charge of environmental administration and environmental law enforcement.
Local participants also persistently find ways to circumvent the law, a phenomenon common in
tropical countries where timber contributes to income for local populations [53,98,102]. Almost all
participants in the timber value chain in western Amazon comply to some degree with the law but
also engage in some illegal practices [4–6]. Thus, legal and illegal logging activities are intertwined
realities that cannot easily be separated. Market opportunities and risks calculations, in addition to
lacking enforcement and corruption, are important reasons why forest entrepreneurs, large or small,
turn to illegal practices. It is unlikely that illegality will be eliminated only using the prevailing
command-and-control approach [103].
Some authors suggest that the economic rationale of small-scale timber extraction is different
from large-scale operations [104] and that market imperfections affect smallholders more than larger
operators [88]. Many smallholders prefer to use chainsaws to undertake logging and sawing timber
using their own labor, rather than pay for somebody else’s [105]. However, even then they require
relatively costly advances of capital from intermediaries. The alternative options for many is to sell
standing trees to intermediaries or chainsaw millers [106]. Intermediaries usually have the resources
and contacts to obtain the necessary permits, or know how to legalize timber [34]. Smallholders usually
have little choice but to accept the conditions imposed by these intermediaries [107].
As a result, smallholders engage in vigorous timber networks, where intermediaries play a central
role but in which buyers who reside in cities, have a major influence on prices [108,109]. Specialized
chainsaw operators as well as intermediaries who have their own harvesting teams, organize the
logging activities. They have the resources to obtain permits—via legal or illegal means—and to
undertake logging operations [5]. Some argue that these participants should be eliminated from the
timber supply chain [110]. They do however, play an important role in the timber markets as they
supply the capital and facilitate trade along the network, which are essential for the supply chain to
work [88].
Timber produced in the Amazon region in the three countries is sold in local markets, mostly
in the region’s towns and cities and distant markets in the larger cities (e.g., La Paz and Santa Cruz
in Bolivia; Lima and Piura in Peru; and Quito and Cuenca in Ecuador). Amazon timber is used for
construction and furniture manufacturing and also sold to external markets in the Argentina, Chile,
USA and lately to China [111]. The cities in the Amazon are the first link to end-markets through an
extended intermediation network [99]. For instance in Pucallpa, Peru, a network of Chinese families
purchases timber from small- to large-scale extractors and export to Chinese markets [112]. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that timber brokers linked to domestic markets operate in the same way. Studies
suggest that timber extracted through illegal ways can be legalized by different means along the supply
chain and costs tend to vary depending on volumes, species and risk considerations [113,114]. Most
participants who make a profit from illegal timber strongly resist change to current practices [115].
5. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper provides a comparative perspective on the implementation and outcomes of forest
policy reforms in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru and how these affect smallholder forestry in their respective
Amazon regions. The reforms, implemented since the mid-1990s created new national forestry regimes
that have changed little until today. The reforms were guided by the SFM principles and sought to
foster forest management that ensured long term forest productivity. The reforms clarified forest
rights, supported improved forest management and possessed legal timber verification. The forest
reforms aligned with wider market liberalization and state democratization. The main assumption
of these forest reforms were that forest management by smallholders could contribute in generating
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incomes from the supply of timber to the markets, while addressing the need for local participation
and livelihoods.
We compared policy reforms and implementation in these countries responding to the questions:
What is the influence of tenure rights in stimulating smallholder forestry? What are the main barriers
preventing the adoption of SFM by smallholders? And why does unauthorized timber extraction
persist among smallholders? Answering these questions is central to further advance forest policy in
Western Amazon while delivering positive outcomes for smallholder livelihoods and forest protection.
These three countries adopted a similar policy framework in order to comply with the policy goals
aligned to SFM and have contributed to the common lessons learnt. Nonetheless, these same countries
have over time adopted diverging pathways in order to overcome some of the main failures of the
forest reforms, which are related to both their design and implementation.
The forest reforms were implemented in a context of increasing local demands for tenure and
claims for growing local participation. Governments to different degrees, made efforts to attend
these local demands since formal tenure became a condition for local people to acquire forest rights.
Nonetheless, several administrative and political constraints limited a majority of smallholders and
communities who were able to formalize their access to land, thus preventing them to access timber
in legal ways. In addition, local participants with formal tenure rights were not able to fully benefit
from their forest resources, even when trying to adhere to SFM. Many barriers worked against this,
including: legal, which implied additional transactions costs; market conditions including, for example,
asymmetries in bargaining power and dependence on intermediaries; and difficulties for accessing
technical services. In addition, timber markets demanded only a few species, which reduced the
incentives to adhere to SFM.
Despite government efforts to improve the control of timber harvesting, smallholders and other
local participants have found ways to circumvent the institutional barriers and reduce the transaction
costs imposed by timber legality verification. Smallholders have built multiple strategies to integrate
into networks supplying timber to the main cities and export markets. But many issues related to
efficiencies in economic rents, the capture and distribution of benefits persist. The lack of compliance
with forest regulations often leads to important state losses due to tax evasion. Informal timber
markets are characterized by significant asymmetries that often result in unequal capturing of benefits.
Usually, informal markets favor intermediaries who have access to capital to meet the timber requests
from buyers in the cities, or international markets. The incomes captured by smallholders from
timber are not high and often complement income from agriculture and off-farm activities. While
smallholders harvest relatively low timber volumes compared to large operations, their economic
reality and the limited support they receive, limits their pursuit of planning and the organization of
timber extraction in a way that optimizes the available forest resources, as should be the case when a
FMP is implemented.
Once the forest reforms were in place, regulators and administrators favored command-and-
control rather than using incentive instruments (e.g., extension and financial services) to facilitate
SFM. This was an important omission in the policy design, even more so since command-and-control
approaches are relatively costly and require coordination between the law enforcement state agencies.
Some forest projects and NGOs provided support to smallholders but they were unable to meet
the overall need for extension and financial services. Finance is often facilitated by intermediaries
but this reinforces existing asymmetries in the supply chain. In addition, the command-and-control
approach emphasized forest conservation to the detriment of people’s livelihoods, which paradoxically
undermined the capacities of smallholders to undertake SFM.
The lack of incentives for smallholders has become a critical issue and governments have
gradually made changes in the policy frameworks, particularly since the late 2000s. The approaches in
overcoming existing constraints have however, been different. In Bolivia and Ecuador, governments
are attempting to implement policy instruments that could better address the needs of smallholders.
The main goal of the new regulations, already issued or under discussion, is to ease administrative
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processes such as obtaining extraction permits, which should vastly improve legal timber extraction
and also enhance smallholder bargaining power in local timber markets, or with timber traders. In
addition, there is a move favoring a more integrated perspective for undertaking forest and farm
management, providing financial support for forest conservation and restoration, adopting more
simplified small-scale timber regulations and improving online systems for timber legality verification.
Interestingly, in Peru more conventional views on command-and-control approaches for the control of
illegal logging still prevail.
The forest reforms undertaken in the western Amazon constitute a case in which changes in
the broader policy regime, linked to market liberalization and state democratization, marked the
beginning of new forest policy regimes that introduced SFM, based on the assumption that its adoption
by different stakeholders, including smallholders, would be stimulated by markets that required a legal
and sustainable timber supply. This assumption did not hold true in practice as smallholders could not
afford the costs and the timber markets preferred the cheapest timber, which usually originated from
illegal operations. At the same time, the governments retained a command-and-control approach but
with no incentives to support a gradual adoption of SFM. The lack of incentives to support smallholders
in pursuing SFM, along with little realistic forest regulations and ineffective enforcement, have tended
to work against the goal embraced by the forest reforms. Under this institutional context, smallholders
found ways to navigate the new legal and institutional landscape but faced constraints that limited
their capturing of benefits in the timber markets, which may work against forest conservation in the
long run.
Interestingly, changes in the broader policy regimes (with Bolivia and Ecuador moving away
from neoliberal policies and Peru continuing to embrace them), have not affected the foundations of
the current forest policy regimes, which remains based on SFM principles. This possibly displays the
level of acceptance and durability of SFM, which is a constant in the three countries. This is likely
the most interesting finding and highlights the value of a comparative perspective for assessing the
policy changes and their outcomes. In addition, our comparative analysis suggests that countries are
diverging and exploring different pathways to overcome institutional constraints.
One pathway is to insist on conventional approaches, to enforce SMF and increase state control in
order to eliminate illegal logging, with outcomes that we have described in this paper. Another pathway
is insisting on the need to build more flexible and integrated frameworks of forest management that
rely on the capacities of smallholders to manage their forests and create the conditions for them to
make meaningful decisions of how to pursue this management. Attempts to build these flexible and
integrated frameworks should however, involve participation of all stakeholders (i.e., smallholders,
chainsawers, intermediaries, forest enterprises and buyers). Therefore, there is a need for options that
can reduce the prevailing market asymmetries, strengthen existing local institutions; and networks
that could minimize those imbalances through the improvement of the conditions for all participants
to be able to bargain within the markets. State government and agencies at the different levels should
play a facilitating, rather than a controlling role, for durable solutions to emerge.
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